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Duff" A Life in the Law. By David Ricardo Williams.
Vancouver: UBC Press, 1984. Pp. xiii, 311. Price: $34.95.
According to Donald G. Creighton wrote, "History is not made
by inanimate forces and human automatons: it is made by living
men and women ... which can best be understood by that
insight into character . . . which is one of the great attributes
of literary art."' The form of that literary art is the biography,
a synthesis of an individual's life, activities, ideas, attitudes and
character, placed within an historical context. The biographer
must look beyond the public perception into the private life
of his subject in hopes of better understanding and explaining
his character and actions. That is what David R. Williams has
set out to do in his biography of one of Canada's most noted
jurists, Sir Lyman Poore Duff. Through the assistance of the
Canada Council and Osgoode Society, Williams, lawyer,
historian and writer-in-residence in the Faculty of Law at the
University of Victoria, has made a valuable contribution to
legal-historical scholarship in Canada.
When preparing a biographical study of Sir Guy Carleton,
A. L. Burt concluded, "Tradition made Carleton divine;
research made him human." 2 So it is with this first and much
overdue biography of Canada's longest serving Chief Justice.
Tradition has portrayed him as a "grim," "godlike personage
whose pronouncements came down as if graven on stone."
3
Williams' research reveals a human being tormented by
alcoholism, indebtedness, impotence and the demands of
judicial impartiality. This book is not an excuse for romantic
hero worshipping. It is, rather, a matter of fact portrayal of
a very public figure, warts and all. Through detailed research
and documentation based on the vast public and more limited
private papers of Duff as well as private papers of prime
ministers, letters, memoirs, interviews, court decisions and royal
1. Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1976) at 220.
2. id. at 219.
3. D. R. Williams, Duff" A Life in the Law, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1984)
at 166.
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commission reports, Williams presents the reader with a study
of Sir Lyman Poore Duff, the strong, conservative jurist and
the frail, liberal private man, his "legalistic side" and his
"literary humanistic side."4 The story is enhanced by sixteen
pages of photos and an excellent detailed index.
While at times the style is disjointed and the text burdened
with case-related material, on the whole, Williams has
successfully achieved that difficult balance between legalistic
writing for legal audiences and narrative writing for lay
audiences. Legal audiences will appreciate the details given
regarding some cases like those of the I'm Alone and the famous
Persons case. Lay audiences will appreciate the restrained detail
of the cases derived from R. B. Bennett's "new deal" legislation
or the Reciprocal Insurers case. Although further editing might
have smoothed out the textual flow, removed some irrelevant
details and developed a more clear theme, Williams has
produced a readable biography with a minimum of legal terms.
Where necessary he has provided simple, clear explanations.
The narrative is spiced with intriguing tidbits of information
about such things as the use of wigs in British Columbia and
enjoys some visually descriptive passages. The reader also feels
that the author as a lawyer, understands the relationship
between bench and bar, the demands and responsibilities placed
on those positions. There is an appreciation for the legal
environment which helps the reader comprehend how Duff
developed into a leading jurist in a short period of time during
the decades that witnessed Canada's emergence as an
independent, increasingly urbanized nation.
Born in Meaford, Ontario in January 1865, Lyman Poore
Duff was a precocious, confident youngster who called himself
a "bully." He read widely even as a child and at age thirteen
decided to pursue a legal career. While at University College,
Toronto, he often attended police and chancery courts. He also
catered to his political interests through debating and
participating in the Young Liberal Club.
Called to the Ontario Bar in 1893 and the British Columbia
Bar in 1895, Duff quickly made a name for himself as a
meticulous barrister, possessing a phenominal memory, great
energy, mastery of the law and power to dominate witnesses
4. id. at 278.
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under cross-examination. In later years he expected much the
same from counsel appearing before him.
His was a truly "meteoric rise to prominence," within the
British Columbia "band of brothers." 5 Although Williams does
not explicitly develop or explain the reasons for this success,
he does point to Duff's keen mind and to specific cases which
gained him a reputation as a barrister knowledgeable in mining,
property and constitutional law. At the same time, Duff was
actively working for the provincial Liberal Association
becoming President in 1902. His political connections
undoubtedly figured in his rise to the bench and could have
been more fully explored by Williams.
After just ten years in practice, Duff crossed "the river of
Lethe" separating the bench from the bar, to sit on the Supreme
Court of British Columbia. The fact that he had served as junior
counsel on the Canadian contingent, appearing before the
Alaska Boundary tribunal, brought him before the public eye
and contributed to his elevation.
Duff had little impact on the B.C. court if only because he
was quickly appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in
1906. Nevertheless, his early decisions revealed a conservative,
literal judicial character which remained throughout his career.
David Williams outlines the criteria for a "sound jurist" but
unfortunately does not expand or develop these requirements
in direct realtion to Duff's career. He does reveal though, that
while Duff was humourless in court, he was unquestionably
knowledgeable of the law. And, if "judgments reveal men," then
Duff's dispassionate, "antiseptic" judgments noted for
"elaborate syntax" reveal much about the judge who rarely
changed his mind. looked to the words for the policy of the
legislature, was guided by the rule of precedent and wrote
complex decisions designed for lawyers and posterity, not for
the edification of the litigants.
Duff, as Williams illustrates, was a man of contrasts and
contradictions. Although a firm believer in capital punishment
for premeditated murder, he was so sensitive as to be physically
ill after passing a death sentence. Although fluently bilingual,
a student of Quebec civil law and a believer in the two founding
nation compact duality of the Canadian Constitution, he was
5. id. at 25.
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despised by many French Canadians because of his role as
central appeal judge under the 1916 Military Service Act.
Although a lifelong Liberal and close friend of Mackenzie
King, he was denied the Chief Justiceship in 1924 partly because
his political sympathies were suspect. Duff always stressed the
importance of judicial impartiality, yet in 1941 he fell victim
to political partiality when as chairman of the parliamentary
inquiry into the Hong Kong expedition, he absolved the King
government and military of any responsibility, apparently
having made up his mind before hearing all the evidence.
Lyman Poore Duff was not a man of the people. He was
a social and intellectual elitist who enjoyed the prestige of office,
cherished British laws, traditions and the monarchy and
regarded his ceremonial opening of Parliament in 1931 as one
of the highlights of his life along with meetings with Kings
Edward VIII and George VI. He greatly valued his position
as Imperial Privy Councillor, appointed in 1919, and his
nomination as an Honourary Bencher of Gray's Inn. He knew
his place on the other side of the bench and hob-nobbed with
the cream of political and legal society, Lord Haldane, the Earl
of Birkenhead, Lord Curzon, Felix Frankfurter, Franklin
Roosevelt, R. B. Bennett, and Mackenzie King.
Duff's view of the Canadian Constitution did not change with
his elevation to Chief Justice of Canada in 1933. As Williams
concludes, "Duff was a judicial technocrat, not a judge of broad
sweep and vision." 6 He believed his role was to interpret the
law as it was worded, not to make new law. Here again the
author does not develop an interpretative theme. While
Williams' stated purpose was to give an understanding of how
the court system operates in Canada and how judges do their
work, he does so through a chronicling of events and cases
rather than through an interpretative framework. Nevertheless,
the clues are there. Clearly Duff's contribution to the Canadian
judicial system and the law was "his entrenchment of earlier
London rulings," 7 by the Privy Council which viewed the
British North America Act as a federal compact of equal self-
governing units.
6. id. at 277.
7. id. at 77.
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Duff has often been criticized as a reactionary whose narrow
conservative interpretations prevented the court from being a
catalyst for social reform. Williams does not deny that side
of Duff's career. He was a literalist and a compact federalist
and together those factors determined his constitutional
interpretations regardless of social climate. Duff helped, to
perpetuate discrimination against Orientals, Blacks and women
by his decisions in such famous cases as Quon- Wing v. The
King, (1914), the Henrietta Muir Edwards v. The King (1928)
and Christie v. York (1940). In 1932 Duff agreed that
the B.C. Government could issue logging permits denying
employment to Orientals. In 1946 he upheld the wartime
deportation of Japanese nationals. Williams does not excuse
these decisions. Rather he reminds the reader that Duff's
decisions must be put in the light of contemporary attitudes
of the majority, especially the social elite, and stresses Duff's
belief in what he regarded was his role as an interpreter of
the law.
Perhaps what are more interesting are those cases which,
although not developed, reveal Duff's more human qualities.
He often demonstrated special concern for the rights of the
accused such as in his ruling that an accused pleading insanity
as a defence need not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt but
only through a preponderence of evidence. He also showed
concern for illegitimate children, orphans and common law
wives. In 1936 he dissented claiming R. B. Bennett's
Employment and Social Insurance Act was constitutional under
the federal powers of taxation and public debt. He could strain
the word, for as Williams suggests, "his innate liberalism may
have guided his pen." 8 The following year Duff won the praise
of the media when he ruled that Alberta's Accurate News and
Information Act was unconstitutional as "it interferred with
the exercise of the right of public discussion." 9 It would appear
that Duff was not so much a social reactionary as a judicial
literalist; thus, in spite of his decision that women were not
"persons," constitutionally free to sit in the Senate, he was
sympathetic to the female argument and Canada's first female
senator, Cairinne Wilson, was a close personal friend.
8. id. at 187.
9. id. at 198.
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David Williams does not fall into the tempting trap of
apologizing for Duff's refusal to be a judicial activist or
reformer. He does not whitewash Duff's position on the Hong
Kong affair. But he does stray into the area of unqualified
and unproven assumptions. For example, he says that Duff
believed in "the essential goodness of men,"' 0 without definition
or specific example. He suggests that the reason for more cases
coming before the courts after World War One was the increase
in crime due to urbanization of Canadian society. This
oversimplification that "the growth of cities fostered crime,'"
has been questioned by social historians and criminologists who
suggest that while crime may have increased, the more
important factors were the improvements in law enforcement
and detection. He tells the reader that Duff quickly gained a
reputation in the area of mining law but provides little evidence,
perhaps because it is difficult to find records of such cases and
arguments.
Duff: A Life in the Law is a treasure trove of information
for historians, politicians and lawyers. Duff played a central
role in so many key events, conscription, prohibition, social
reform, to name a few, that material is included which relates
to social, political, economic, as well as legal aspects of
Canadian life. Students of Canadian history would be well
advised to refer to this work for information on the Alaska
Boundary decision, rum-running cases such as the I'm
Alone, Bennett's "New Deal" legislation, the Hong Kong affair,
and conscription. Also hidden within the book are excellent
accounts of behind-the-scenes patronage seeking by potential
judges and attempts by politicians to receive special concessions
and privileges. Duff spoke volumes when he told Lord Haldane,
"You can have very little idea of the liberties some Canadian
ministers will allow themselves in influencing judges.'
12
In spite of some stylistic weaknesses, general assumptions,
and lack of thematic development, David Williams' biography
of Sir Lyman Poore Duff fulfills the requirements of a good
biography. It will .be enjoyed by lawyer and layman alike as
it turns the "grim" senior jurist into a "living" man. Only the
most critical reader will be concerned by the weaknesses.
10. id. at 73.
11. id. at 72.
12. id. at 215.
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Lawyers and historians will wish that Williams had been more
explicit and interpretative in explaining in what ways Duff's
career reveals how Canadian high courts work, how judges do
their work and what strengths and weaknesses there are in the
judicial system then and now. That was his stated purpose but
he falls somewhat short. Lay readers, however, will gain a good
feel for the times and for Duff, the appearance and the reality,
his outward accomplishments and inner torments, the judicial
technocrat and the "human being wracked by inner torments...
who left a mark on the judicial history of Canada that has





13. id. at 129-130.
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The Northwest Passage: Arctic Straits. By Donat Pharand in
association with Leonard H. Legault. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984. Pp xxii, 199.
Price: US $44.00.
This study, being the seventh volume of the International Straits
of the World series and written by a distinguished alumnus
of this Law School, is designed primarily for the non-Canadian
or Arctic-specialist. Past volumes have covered such straits as
Malacca and Singapore, the Northeast Arctic, Baltic, Gibraltar
and Hormuz and each provide a discussion of the geography,
uses and politics regarding the particular strait, as well as, a
discussion of the significant legal issues that arise.
The goal of this book follows that of its predecessors -
to discuss the past and potential uses of the Northwest Passage
as a corridor for navigation and to look at the issues of
international law that relate to the Passage. The details the
travails of the northern explorers first opened the Arctic waters,
the successful navigations of the Passage made in this Century,
the environmental and strategic concerns about use of the
Northwest Passage, the potential for hydrocarbon and mining
development, and the possible impacts of all such activities on
the Inuit. One distinction between this strait and most others
is the presence of ice. Some of the peculiarities that arise because
of this are discussed while others are not. For example, there
is no explanation of what the difference is between a class 10
icebreaker and a class 6 or 7 and why that is important.
The author's preface indicates that this work was originally
to be coauthored by Dr. Pharand and Leonard Legault, Q.C.
Mr. Legault, Legal Adviser to the Canadian Department of
External Affairs, was unable to contribute to the book with
the result that Dr. Pharand is the author and Mr. Legault
acknowledged on the title page as an associate. Given Mr.
Legault's senior position with the Canadian Government,
assumptions could be made that this book accurately reflects
the position of the Canadian Government on the sensitive issues
relating to Canadian Arctic sovereignty.
The author gives three chapters to the principal legal issues
regarding the Northwest Passage. From the Canadian
perspective the key question is the extent to which Canadian
jurisdiction applies to the waters of the Northwest Passage.
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Dr. Pharand does not deal with the Canadian claim that
the waters of the Northwest Passage are historic internal waters
and hence under the complete jurisdiction of Canada. This
Canadian claim to the waters a historic internal waters, however,
is evaluated in a manuscript written by Dr. Pharand and to
be published in 1985 or 1986 entitled "The Waters of the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago in International Law." In this text
he concludes "that Canada would not succeed in establishing
that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are historic
internal waters." The author does point out the possibility that
by drawing straight baselines according to the 1951 Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, a decision of the International Court
of Justice, the waters thereby enclosed would become the
exclusive sovereignty of Canada. Although raising this point
there is little discussion about this possibility and the
counterarguments that could be raised. In the Anglo-Norwegian
Case Norway's ability to acquire complete sovereignty of the
waters landward of the straight baselines drawn along the coastal
island fringe was a result of its historic use of those waters.
The criteria for baseline drawing in the 1951 case has been
superceded in customary international law by the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(the LOS Convention) both of which indicate that waters
enclosed by straight baselines allow for the continued right of
innocent passage for foreign ships. In the above mentioned
manuscript on the waters of the arctic archipelago, Dr. Pharand
does discuss the possible use of historic consolidation of title
as showing historic use of waters landward of straight baselines
which might aid Canada in meeting one of these objections.
Although not detailing his view on the possibility of the waters
of the Northwest Passage being internal waters and under the
complete jurisdiction of Canada, the author proceeds assuming
that such a claim would not be substantiated.
It has long been Dr. Pharand's view that the Northwest
Passage is not a "strait used for international navigation" and
thus does not entitle foreign-flag vessels a right of nonsuspen-
dable innocent passage pursuant to the 1958 Territorial Sea
Convention or transit passage as outlined in the 1982 LOS
Convention. This is a conclusion not accepted by the potential
major non-Canadian user of the Northwest Passage, the United
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States. The author does indicate that the Passage might be
elevated to an international strait if non-Canadian traffic were
to increase substantially in the Northwest Passage. He suggests
a number of measures that could be taken by Canada to prevent
the Northwest Passage from becoming an international strait.
Actions suggested include: the drawing of straight baselines
around the Arctic archipelago; increasing the presence of
Canadian vessels in the Arctic; establishing and enforcing a
vessel transit management system to control shipping in the
Passage;(1) and entering into user agreements with states using
the Northwest Passage.
In examining the extent to which Canadian jurisdiction
applies in the Northwest Passage reference must be made to
the 1982 LOS Convention provisions regarding the regime of
straits and right of innocent passage. The 1982 LOS Convention
has not yet come into force and probably will not for several
years. Canada is a signatory to the Treaty but has not yet made
a decision whether to ratify. More importantly, the United States
has rejected the LOS Convention and, in fact, has worked
actively against the Convention. The rejection of the Treaty
by the United States raises important questions about the
applicability of the LOS Convention to a non-party(2) and the
status of the provisions of the LOS Convention in customary
international law. It is the view of the United States that the
provisions on straits in the LOS Convention which ensure a
right of transit passage through straits used for international
navigation enclosed by 12-n. mile territorial seas (similar to
a right of passage through high seas) have either emerged as
a norm of customary international law or are so worded in
the LOS Convention to clearly be for the benefit of parties
and nonparties alike. This is a position vehemently rejected
by many of the negotiators who participated in the drafting
of the LOS Convention.
Another United States position that may arise from its
nonacceptance on the 1982 LOS Convention is U.S. non-
1. See generally Cynthia Lamson and David L. VanderZwaag, eds. Transit
Management in the Northwest Passage: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
2. See luke T. Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, (1983),
77 American Journal of International Law 541-568.
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recognition of the extension of 12-n. mile territorial seas in
international straits where previously there had been unimpeded
traffic because of the existence of high seas. One route through
the Northwest Passage using the M'Clure Strait would allow
a vessel to navigate through the Passage without coming within
a 3-n. mile territorial sea. In 1969 the Manhattan attempted
to use this route but it got caught in the heavy ice of the M'Clure
Strait and had to use a much narrower waterway. Dr. Pharand
makes note of this issue but provides very little commentary.
He does not deal at all with the difficulties that arise from
Canadian or American nonacceptance of the 1982 LOS
Convention. The unstated view seems to be that the Canadian-
American positions on the multilateral LOS Convention are
incidental to legal realities in the Northwest Passage, that
applicability of the LOS Convention in the Passage is a bilateral
issue for the two countries to resolve, and that the issues are
not important since the key Arctic provision in the LOS
Convention is already customary international law.
The most startling aspect of this book is the treatment given
the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of Canada
and Article 234 of the 1982 LOS Convention, the ice-covered
waters provision. The Arctic Waters legislation and the
extension of the territorial sea from 3 to 12-n. miles were
designed to give Canada national jurisdiction over the waters
of the Arctic and to ensure that the vessels using the waters
met strict construction, manning and equipment requirements
designed to mitigate against environmental disaster. These
actions were necessitated by the U.S.-sponsored voyage of the
Manhattan through the Northwest Passage which was perceived
by Canada as a challenge to its sovereignty over the waters
of the Passage. The United States protested the legislation which
it viewed as breaching international law. Canada went on a
campaign during the 1970s to gather international support for
its Arctic Waters legislation. at the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, Canada succeeded in having a special
provision, article 234, inserted in the LOS Convention which,
it argues, provides international justification for its Arctic waters
legislation.
Article 234 allows coastal states bordering ice-covered waters
to prescribe and enforce laws for the protection of the marine
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environment that are more stringent than internationally
accepted standards.
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in
ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the
presence of the ice covering such areas for most of the year
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and
pollution of the marine environment would cause major harm
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and
the protection and preservation of the marine enviroment
based on the best available scientific evidence.
It is Dr. Pharand's opinion that the Arctic Waters legislation
is in conformity with the wording of Article 234, that Article
234 would allow Canada to enforce special standards on vessels
utilizing the Northwest Passage regardless of the legal regime
applicable to the waters of the Passage, and that Canada may
now take such action since article 234 is already part of
customary international law. With the exception of the second
proposition, which is dependent on the third proposition, these
opinions are expressed without elaborate critical evaluation.
Dr. Pharand does not scrutinize the Arctic Waters legislation
or Article 234. One such evaluation raises real doubts as to
the extent that Article 234 either supports the Arctic Waters
legislation or could be usefully used by Canada to protect the
marine environment of the Arctic. 3 Legislative implementation
of Article 234 might necessitate substantial alterations in the
Arctic Waters legislation. A rigorous textual analysis of the
wording of the provision gives rise to numerous serious
ambiguities.
The author's opinion that Article 234 has emerged as part
of customary international law is based on the lack of protest
from the United States (since 1970) and other interested states
to the Arctic Waters legislation and the "consensus" reached
3. D.M. McRae and D.J. Goundrey, Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic
Waters: The Extent of Article 234, (1982), 16 University of British Columbia
Law Review 197-228 and see Ted L. McDorman, National legislation and
Convention obligations: Canadian vessel-source pollution law, (1983), 7
Marine Policy 302, at 308.
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on the provision during the negotiation of the LOS Convention.
This "consensus" has been described as being "an attempt to
appease Canada and its intense commitment to its Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act."4 The LOS Convention is not yet
in force, Canada has not ratified the Treaty, and the United
States has openly rejected the Treaty. The general U.S. position
on the non-deep seabed provisions of the LOS Convention has
been to make general statements that they are all part of
customary international law and then proceed to reinterpret
the provisions to fit the U.S. perspective. In short, one should
be suspect of broad acceptance by the United States of provisions
of the LOS Convention and equally suspicious of silence on
certain provisions. Admittedly, the United States has not
specifically "faulted" Article 234 and there do exist some
indications that the provision has or will be accepted by the
United States as part of customary international law. 5 The
comments of former Canadian Ambassador to the Law of the
Sea Conference Alan Beesley made in 1983 are of interest:
... I would hesitate, for example, to say that the Arctic exception,
the ice-covered waters provision, is already existing international
law. However, I am relieved to hear others say it is, and I will take
that into account.6
The elevation of Article 234 to customary international law would
be very convenient for Canada. It would remove one of the major
reasons for ratifying the LOS Convention since the controversial
Arctic Waters legislation could arguably be supported by Article
234. This posture may look like Canadian opportunism since
there are now some indications that Canada may not ratify
the LOS Convention despite being one of the major beneficiaries
of the Treaty. It also gives rise to the "pick and choose"
4. R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and
International
Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), at 247.
5. See Kurt M. Shusterich, "International Jurisdictional Issues in the Arctic
Ocean," in William E. Westermeyer and Kurt M. Shusterich, eds. United
States Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 1990s (New York: Springer-Verlag,
1984), at 254 and Brian Hoyle, "The United States Government Perspective"
in Lawrence Juda, ed. The United States Without the Law of the Sea Treaty:
Opportunities and Costs (Wakefield, Rhode Island: Times Press, 1983), at
135.
6. J. Alan Beesley, "Comment" in Juda, note 5, supra, at 141.
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arguments that have been used against the United States as
being contrary to the "package deal" understanding that led
to the completion of the LOS Convention, suggestions of bad
faith in negotiations, and the willingness of certain states to
accept those parts of the Treaty it likes and reject those parts
it does not like. Such criticism of the U.S. rejection-policy has
been expressed, for example, by Ambassador Beesley.
The foremost world authority on the international law of
the sea in the Arctic has provided us with his views on the
crucial issues of navigational rights and Canadian jurisdiction
in the Northwest Passage. This alone makes this volume of
interest. It is with impatience that we now look forward to
Dr. Pharand's next offering "The Waters of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago in International Law."
Ted L. McDorman
Faculty of Law
University of Victoria

